Endogeneity arises for numerous reasons in models of consumer choice. It leads to inconsistency with standard estimation methods that maintain independence between the model's error and the included variables. The authors describe a control function approach for handling endogeneity in choice models. Observed variables and economic theory are used to derive controls for the dependence between the endogenous variable and the demand error. The theory points to the relationships that contain information on the unobserved demand factor, like the pricing equation and the advertising equation. The authors' approach is an alternative to the commonly-used Berry, Levinsohn, Pakes (1995) product-market controls for unobserved quality. The authors apply both methods to examine households' choices among television options, including basic and premium cable packages, where unobserved attributes, such as quality of programming, are expected to be correlated with price. Without correcting for endogeneity, aggregate demand is estimated to be upward-sloping, suggesting omitted attributes are positively correlated with demand. Both the control function method and the product-market controls method produce downward-sloping demand estimates that are very similar.
6 standard estimation techniques.
The idea behind the control function correction is to derive a proxy variable that conditions on the part of y nj that depends on ε nj . If this can be done then the remaining variation in the endogenous variable will be independent of the error and standard estimation approaches will again be consistent.
In this discrete choice context the approach posits that y nj can be written as a function of all exogenous variables entering utility for any of the choices, denoted x n , the variables z n that do not enter utility directly but that do impact y nj (typically the instruments), and a vector of J unobserved terms μ n :
(2) y nj = W(x n ,z n ,μ n ).
The approach maintains that μ n and ε nj are independent of x n and z n but are not independent of each other. This equation illustrates the source of the dependence between y nj and ε nj, as μ n impacts y nj and is also not independent of ε nj .
The key to the control function approach is to note that, under the maintained assumptions, conditional on μ n , ε nj is independent of y nj . The feasibility of the control function approach in any setting will be determined by whether the practitioner is able to recover μ n so it can be conditioned upon when the parameters are estimated. 5 We analyze the control function case when y nj is additive in its observed and unobserved covariates. A special case that is illustrative is when there is a single unobserved factor μ nj for each choice j:
(3) y nj = W(x n ,z n ; γ) + μ nj.
where we make explicit γ the parameters of this function. With additivity and the independence assumptions, the controls μ nj are straightforward to recover using any 7 standard estimator (like OLS). The question becomes how one enters the new controls into the utility function to condition out the dependence between y nj and ε nj .
One approach enters μ nj in a flexible manner so as to condition out any function of it. Decomposing ε nj into the part that can be explained by a general function of μ nj and the residual yields:
(4) ε nj = CF(μ nj ; λ) + . nj ε where CF(μ nj ; λ) denotes the control function with parameters λ. The simplest approximation is to specify the control function as linear in μ nj, in which case the control function is CF(μ nj ; λ) = λμ nj, λ is a scalar, and utility is given as (5) U nj = V(y nj, x n, β n ) + λ μ nj + nj ε Alternatively one could allow for a polynomial approximation, adding higher-order terms of μ nj. and the necessary additional parameters.
More generally, one might want to condition on the entire vector of controls μ n for any choice j when calculating the control function. In this case we have (6) ε nj = CF(μ n; λ) + . nj ε which can be approximated to first order with a vector of parameters CF(μ n ;λ) = λ' μ n.
Again, higher-order terms are straightforward to add, although parameters increase rapidly in the number of alternative choices.
Given the researcher's chosen control function specification, we then have:
(7) U nj = V(y nj, x n, β n ) + CF(μ n, λ) + nj ε .
Conditional on μ n , the probability that consumer n chooses alternative i is equal to (8) P ni = ∫ I(U ni > U nj ∀ j ≠ i ) f (β n , n ε ) d β n d n ε
PARAMETRIC FUNCTIONAL FORMS
We consider several parametric forms for the errors in both equations. These parametric forms lead to direct parametric forms for the control function itself and the distribution of the demand residuals conditional on the controls. While they need not be maintained, they do provide an alternative to entering μ n flexibly in utility and then choosing a distributional assumption for nj ε .
Example 1: Jointly normal errors, independent over j
Suppose μ nj and ε nj are jointly normal for each j and iid over j. Then (9) CF(μ n; λ) = E(ε nj | μ n )= λμ nj for each j and the deviations nj ε = ε nj -CF(μ n; λ) are independent of μ nj and all other regressors. Thus, the control function for each alternative is the residual from the endogenous variable regression interacted with λ, the one coefficient to be estimated.
Utility is (10) U nj = V(y nj, x nj, β n ) + λμ nj + nj ε where nj ε is iid normal with zero mean.
If β n is fixed, then the model is an independent probit with the residual entering as an extra variable. If β n is random, then the model is a mixed independent probit, mixed over the density of β n (Train, 2003, Chs. 5 and 6 on probit and mixed logit.) It is where η nj is iid standard normal. The model is a mixed logit, with mixing over the error components η nj , whose standard deviation σ is estimated, as well as over the random elements of β n . The scale in the original utility is normalized by setting the scale of the extreme value distribution for ε 2 nj .
Example 3: Extreme value and joint normal error components, correlation over j
The generalization is straightforward conceptually, but increases the number of parameters considerably. Let ε Ω. This covariance matrix is 2J x 2J and is composed of submatrices labeled Ω μμ , Ω με , Ω εε Then CF(μ n; λ) = E(ε 1 n | μ n ) = Λμ n , where the elements of matrix Λ are related to the elements of Ω: Λ = Ω με Ω -1 μμ . Stacked utilities become:
(12) U n = V(y n, x n, β n ) + Λμ n + Γη n + ε 2 n where η n is now a vector of J iid standard normal deviates and Γ is the lower-triangular
μμ Ω με . In this case, the residuals for each alternative enter the utility of all alternatives, and the mixing is over a set of J normal error components. Villas-Boas and Winer (1999, section 3) generalize this specification further by allowing ε 2 n to be correlated over alternatives, specifying it to be normally distributed instead of extreme value to accommodate this correlation.
PRICING BEHAVIOR AND THE CONTROL FUNCTION APPROACH
Consider consumers' choice among products where the endogenous variable y nj is price p nj . We investigate the control function approach using some variant of the controls suggested above with both marginal cost and monopoly pricing. The utility that consumer n obtains from product j is specified as in example 2: where η nj is iid standard normal. The same specification is appropriate when there is a constant markup over cost in the determination of prices.
Monopoly pricing
Consider monopoly pricing where price depends on the elasticity of demand as well as marginal cost. The pricing equation for a monopolist is:
result implies that the analyst can specify a distribution of ε 1 n conditional μ n , as needed for the control function approach, and know that there is some distribution of ν n and ε 1 n that gives rise to it.
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA
As illustration we apply the control function approach to households' choice of television reception options. The specification and data are similar to those of Goolsbee 14 not differentiate which of these options the households chose. Goolsbee and Petrin describe the market for cable and satellite TV, emphasizing the importance of accounting for endogeneity of price, which arises because unobserved attributes of cable TV like the quality of programming are not independent of price.
Our sample consists of 11,810 households in 172 geographically distinct markets.
Each market contains one cable franchise that offers basic, extended, and premium
packages. There are a number of multiple system operators like AT&T and Time-Warner which own many cable franchises throughout the country (thus serving several markets).
The price and other attributes of the cable options vary over markets, even for markets served by the same multiple system operator. Satellite prices do not vary geographically, and the price of antenna-only is assumed to be zero. The price variation that is needed to estimate price impacts arises from the cable alternatives. More details of the data are given in the Web Appendix.
Since the attributes of the TV alternatives are the same for all households in a geographic market, we add a subscript for markets. Let U njm be the utility that household n who lives in market m obtains from alternative j. The price of alternative j in market m is p mj , which is not subscripted by n since it is the same for all households in the market m. Price is zero for antenna TV, and the price of satellite TV does not vary over markets or households. The price of the two cable options varies over geographic markets, and unobserved attributes of cable service (such as quality of programming) are expected to be correlated with price. The utility of the two cable options (j = 2,3) is specified as in example 2:
where ε 1 nj is correlated with price, ε 2 nj is iid extreme value, and x nj, captures exogenous observed attributes. Utility for the two options with constant price (j = 1,4) is the same but without the correlated error component ε 1 nj . Price for the cable options is specified as linear in instruments plus a separable error:
We specify μ mj and ε 1 nj for j = 2,3 to be jointly normal, independent over j. Utility with the control function for alternative j = 2,3 is then:
where η nj is standard normal.
To complete the model, we specify V(·) as:
The price effect is specified to differ by income group. Five income groups are identified, with the lowest income group taken as the base. The dummy d gn identifies whether household n is in income group g. The price coefficient for a household in the lowest income group is α while that for a household in group g > 1 is α + θ g . The nonprice attributes x mj enter with fixed coefficients. The alternative-specific constant for 16 alternative j is k j . These constants are entered directly and also interacted with demographic variables, s n .
An error component is included to allow for correlation in unobserved utility over the three non-antenna alternatives. In particular, c j = 1 if j is one of the three non-antenna alternatives and c j = 0 otherwise, and ω n is an iid standard normal deviate. The coefficient φ is the standard deviation of this error component, reflecting the degree of correlation among the non-antenna alternatives.
The choice probability therefore takes the form of a mixed logit (Train, 1998; Brownstone and Train, 1999) , with the mixing over the distribution of the error components:
where φ(·)is the standard normal density and
The integral is approximated through simulation: a value of η 2 , η 3, and ω is drawn from their standard normal densities, the logit formula is calculated for this draw, the process is repeated for numerous draws, and the results are averaged. To increase accuracy, Halton (1960) draws are used instead of independent random draws. Bhat(2001) found that 100
Halton draws perform better than 1000 independent random draws, a result that has been 
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RESULTS
The first step of the approach is to estimate the pricing functions to recover the residuals entering the control functions in the choice model. The price in each market was regressed against the product attributes listed in Table 2 plus Hausman (1997a)-type price instruments. The price instrument for market m is calculated as the average price in other markets that are served by the same multiple system operator as market m. 7 In our context, these instruments are appropriate if the prices of the same multiple system operator in other markets reflect common costs of the multiple system operator but not common demand shocks (like unobserved advertising). A separate instrument is created for the price of extended-basic cable and the price of premium cable and separate regressions were run for extended-basic price and premium price using all instruments in each equation.
8
The residuals from these regressions enter without transformation in the mixed logit model; that is, the control functions are a coefficient times the product-market residual, which is the first and simplest specification proposed from the model section.
Specifically, the residual from the extended-basic cable price regression enters the extended-basic cable alternatives, and similarly for the premium cable. Table 2 gives the estimated parameters. The variables are listed in three groups:
those that vary over markets but not over consumers in each market, those that vary over consumers in each market, and the extra variables that are included to correct for endogeneity. The first column gives the model without any correction for the correlation between price and omitted attributes; utility is the same as specified above except that the for whether the household rents its dwelling is included in the two cable alternatives and separately in the satellite alternative. These variables account for the fact that renters are perhaps less able to install a cable hookup and less willing to incur the capital cost of a satellite dish than a household that owns its dwelling. The estimated coefficients are negative, confirming these expectations. Finally, a dummy for whether the household lives in a single-family dwelling enters the satellite alternative, to account for the fact that it is relatively difficult to install a satellite dish on a multi-family dwelling. As expected, the estimated coefficient is positive.
Fewer coefficients are significant in the model with correction for endogeneity than uncorrected. This result is expected, since the correction for endogeneity is attempting to obtain more information from the data (namely, the relation of unobserved factors to price, and well as the relation of observed factors to demand.) Stated alternatively, the uncorrected model gives a false sense of precision by assuming that price is independent of unobserved factors, when in fact price is related to these factors.
Interestingly, all of the coefficients that become insignificant with correction, when they were significant without correction, are for variables that vary over markets but not over consumers in each market. This pattern reflects the fact that unobserved attributes that are correlated with price vary over markets but not consumers within each market, since price itself only varies over markets. 
ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
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The appropriate control function and distribution for jn ε is a specification issue.
We tried other specifications, including: both residuals entering in each cable alternative (to allow for correlation across alternatives as in example 3); a series expansion, both signed and unsigned, of the residuals (to allow for the conditional mean not being exactly as given by a joint normal); correlated rather than independent error components; exclusion of one or both of the error components (since they are not significant). These alternative specifications all provided very similar results.
As always with endogeneity, the selection of instruments is an issue. As stated above, we used the product attributes and Hausman-type prices as instruments, which are widely used but controversial (Bresnahan, 1997; Hausman, 1997b) . With disaggregate demand models, the need for additional instruments is not as stringent as in models with just aggregate data because aggregate demographics do not enter the disaggregate models but do affect market price. They can therefore serve as the extra instruments that are needed for demand estimation.
9
We re-estimated the model without using the prices in other areas as instruments but including the aggregate demographics. With the control function approach, the estimated price coefficient rose when the Hausman-type prices were removed as instruments. This is the direction of change that would be expected if the prices in other markets incorporated the impact of unobserved demand shocks. The other coefficients were not affected under either approach. 
COMPARISON WITH PRODUCT-MARKET CONTROL
22
Given the widespread use of the Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) approach, we provide a brief comparison with the control function approach, and then we discuss BLP model estimation and results for the same data.
The BLP approach uses the aggregate demand equations to recover the unobserved demand factors by matching observed market shares to those predicted by the model. In contrast, our control function approach is based on looking to different equations for information on the unobserved demand factor, like the pricing or advertising equation.
In most applications the control function approach will be easier to implement than the BLP approach. Often the first step is just a regression and the second is maximum likelihood, so the approach can be estimated with standard software packages such as STATA, SAS (which now has a mixed logit and probit routine), LIMDEP, and
Biogeme.
10
The two-step estimator requires one to account for the estimated regressors (as discussed earlier), and the sampling covariance can be estimated by bootstrap with these packages.
One must incorporate a contraction procedure into the estimation routine to implement the BLP estimator. It iteratively calculates the constants that equate predicted and actual shares at each trial value of the parameters. This computation is not trivial, especially when consumer-level data is being used in the estimated specification. Because of this computational burden the BLP procedure is to our knowledge still not available in any of the common statistical packages.
Since the BLP approach matches observed to predicted shares in a non-linear setting, it turns out to be very sensitive to sampling error in market shares, as shown in Berry, Linton, and Pakes (2004) . It is not consistent in settings where there are zero, one, or just a small number of purchase observations per product relative to the number of consumers, as in true in some data sets. 11 It also requires all goods to be strict substitutes, something not required by the control function setup.
The BLP approach includes a constant δ mj for each alternative in each market.
All of the elements of utility that do not vary within a market are subsumed into these constants. The utility specification given above becomes:
The constants are expressed as a function of price and other observed attributes:
(25) δ mj = αp mj + τx mj + δ j k j + ε The results are given in Table 3 . The bottom part of the table gives the estimates of the demographic coefficients in the mixed logit model. The top part of the table gives the results of the regression of constants on product attributes. The first column at the top gives the OLS results, which do not account for omitted attributes, and the second column gives the 3SLS results.
As with the control function approach, the correction for omitted variables raises the estimated price coefficients. Without correction, three of the five income groups receive a positive estimated price coefficient. With correction, all groups obtain a significantly negative price coefficient.
The estimated base price coefficient is -.0922, compared to the -0.1003 obtained with the control function approach. The estimates of θ g , the incremental price coefficient for higher income groups, are very similar under the two approaches. As in the control function approach, the number of cable channels obtains a negative coefficient when endogeneity is ignored and becomes positive as expected when the endogeneity is corrected. All of the product attributes obtain similar values as with the control function approach.
The demographic coefficients in Table 3 25 satellite reception more readily than households who live in multi-family dwellings.
Differences appear not to be statistically significant. Table 4 gives price elasticities from the models for each approach. The two methods give similar elasticities. For example, the same-price elasticity for basic and extended cable is -1.08 with the control function approach and -0.97 under the BLP approach.
CONCLUSION
The concern that price, advertising, or other variables are endogenous has proven to be important in many applications. In this paper we propose a control function approach for handling endogeneity in choice models. It uses observed variables and economic theory to derive controls for the part of the unobserved demand factor that is not independent of the endogenous variable. We use the pricing equation in this paper to derive controls, but we believe there are many other possible equations -like the advertising equation -which also contain information on unobserved demand factors.
The approach provides an alternative to the commonly-used Berry, Levinsohn, Pakes (1995) product-market controls for unobserved quality, which is sensitive to sampling error in market shares, more difficult to estimate -especially with consumer-level data -and not applicable for many recently proposed discrete choice demand estimators.
We apply both methods to examine households' choices among television options, including basic and premium cable packages, where unobserved attributes, such as quality of programming, are expected to be correlated with price. Without correcting for approach with cross-sectional market data; Villas-Boas and Winer use lagged prices as insrtuments in their time-series model.
8. The use of alternative instruments is discussed in the robustness section.
9. Consider two households that have the same demographics but live in areas where the aggregate demographics are different. Part of the price difference between the two areas is presumably attributable to the difference in aggregate demographics.
This part of the price difference provides variation in price over households that can be used for estimation of price response.
10. Matlab and gauss codes for mixed logit are also available (free) from Train's website at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~train/software.html.
11. E.g., in many housing datasets, houses are only observed to be purchased zero or 12. The negative of the number of over-the-air channels enters these equations, since this attribute enters the antenna-only alternative in the model of Table 2 whereas it is now entering the constants for the non-antenna alternatives. To minimize sampling error in market shares, we restricted our analysis to markets where there are at least 30 respondents in the Forrester survey. This screen yields 300 cable franchise markets with a total of almost 30,000 households. We randomly choose 172 of these 300 markets, so as to reduce the number of constants that needed to be estimated.
From these 172 markets, we randomly selected 11810 households, oversampling those households from smaller markets (again, to minimize sampling error). These 11810 households are used in the estimation with weights equal to the inverse of their probability of being sampled.
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As stated in the body of the paper, the alternatives in the discrete choice model are:
expanded basic cable, premium cable (which can only be purchased bundled with expanded basic), Direct Broadcast Satellite, and no multi-channel video (i.e., local antenna reception only). In the Forrester survey, respondents reported whether they have cable or satellite, and the amount they spend on premium television. We classified respondents as having premium if they reported that they have cable and spend more than $10 per month on premium viewing, which is the average price of the most popular premium channel, HBO. We classified respondents as choosing expanded basic if they reported that they have cable and they spend less than $10 per month on premium viewing.
The survey provides various demographic characteristics, including family income, household size, education, and type of living accommodations. It also includes an identifier for the household's television market, which can be used to link households to their cable franchise provider.
The cable franchise market of each surveyed household was matched to cable system information from Warren Publishing's 2001 Television and Cable Factbook. The attributes we include are the channel capacity of a cable system, the number of pay channels available, whether pay per view is available from that cable franchise, the price of basic plus expanded basic service, and the price of premium service. We also obtain from the Factbook the number of over-the-air channels available in the franchise market.
Finally, for the price of satellite, we use $50 per month plus an annual $100 installation
